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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






SNJEZANA JELACA BAGIC, DDS, 




 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH; 
 BERNARD J. COSTELLO, DMD, MD, individually,  
 and in his official capacity as Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs  
 of the University of Pittsburgh School of Dental Medicine  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 2-18-cv-0511) 
District Judge:  Hon. Arthur J. Schwab 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 3, 2019 
 
Before:   SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 








                                                 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 




JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Snjezana Bagic appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her complaint under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 alleging ethnic discrimination.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will vacate and remand.  
I. BACKGROUND1 
 Beginning in 2008, Bagic was an instructor and faculty member at the University 
of Pittsburgh’s School of Dental Medicine (the “University” or “Dental School”).  Long 
before that, in the early 1990s, she had fought in what she calls “the Patriotic War in 
Croatia.”  (App. at 79.)  At some point after she began working at the University, she 
came into conflict with her colleague Sean Noonan, an Assistant Professor at the Dental 
School.  Bagic became concerned that Noonan had been “abus[ing] his privileges as a 
faculty member,” so, “on more than one occasion, [she] made complaints and/or 
informed” her Department Chair about Noonan’s actions.  (App. at 77-78.)  Bagic also 
personally raised her concerns with Noonan.     
 As a result of their dispute, “Noonan undertook a settled plan for the purpose of 
discrediting Bagic and preventing [her] from interfering with his activities.”  (App. at 78.)  
To that end, “Noonan falsely stated to several University related individuals that Bagic 
threatened to kill him.”  (App. at 79.)  Specifically, “Noonan alleged to University 
personnel that Bagic [had] indicated [that] she had killed before in the war and would kill 
                                                 
 1 The facts are based upon Bagic’s amended complaint, with all reasonable 
inferences drawn in her favor.  See Blanyar v. Genova Prods. Inc., 861 F.3d 426, 431 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (“When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we ‘accept all factual allegations 
as true, [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]’” 
(citation omitted)).    
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him.”  (App. at 79.)  And Noonan asked Bagic, in front of University faculty members, if 
“she was armed[.]”  (App. at 79 (quotation marks omitted).)   
 Noonan’s allegations resulted in an investigation, and another faculty member, 
Bernard Costello, was tasked with investigating the alleged threats.  According to Bagic, 
however, Costello “undertook a biased investigation” “with a predetermined result.”  
(App. at 79.)  That bias was in part proven, she says, by handwritten notes from that 
investigation showing an emphasis on her ethnicity and her time on “the front lines” of 
the Croatian war.  (App. at 81 (quotation marks omitted).)  The investigation led to 
Costello “falsely represent[ing] [to the University] that Bagic had admitted on several 
occasions to threatening to kill Noonan[.]”  (App. at 80.)  Following the investigation, the 
University terminated Bagic’s employment.   
 She then pursued an internal appeal.  The hearing panel assigned to the appeal 
recommended, and the University Chancellor found, that: (1) “[t]he information provided 
by Costello to [the University] was not reliable;” (2) “Costello’s investigation was 
flawed;” (3) “[t]he Dental School was unable to establish Bagic had threatened to kill 
Noonan;” (4) “Bagic’s termination was unreasonable;” and (5) “Bagic’s alleged threats to 
kill Noonan could not be substantiated.”  (App. at 81.)  Nonetheless, the University 
refused to reinstate Bagic.   
 Bagic then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, claiming that the University and Costello (the “Defendants”) discriminated 
against her on the basis of her Croatian ethnicity, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  The 
Defendants moved to dismiss Bagic’s claim and that motion was granted, but Bagic was 
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given leave to amend.  She did so,2 and the Defendants again moved to dismiss.  
Attached to that motion were excerpts from the University internal appeal proceeding and 
Costello’s investigation.  Based on those documents and the allegations in Bagic’s 
complaint, the District Court concluded that Bagic had failed to adequately plead 
discrimination based on her Croatian ethnicity, despite observing that it was “somewhat 
unclear what the specific threat [made by Bagic] was” and that Costello’s references to 
her time “‘on the front lines’ in the Croatian war seemingly would indicate a bias against 
her on the basis of her ethnicity[.]”  (App. at 8 n.2, 10 (citation omitted).)   
 Bagic timely appealed.   
II. DISCUSSION3 
 Invoking 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Bagic alleges that, based on Costello’s 
biased investigation, the University terminated her employment because of her ethnicity.   
To establish a right to relief, Bagic “must show … an intent to discriminate on the basis 
of race by the defendant[.]”4  Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 288 F.3d 548, 569 
                                                 
 2 In her amended complaint, Bagic made clear that her claims were under both 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review of a district 
court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).”  Blanyar, 861 F.3d at 431.   
 
 4 In all, Bagic “must show (1) that [s]he belongs to a racial minority;” (2) 
discriminatory intent; “and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the activities 
enumerated in § 1981, including the right to make and enforce contracts.”  Pryor v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 288 F.3d 548, 569 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Ethnicity is covered by the category of race.  See e.g., Fisher 
v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (discussing equal protection claims, 
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(3d Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  But she is not required to 
prove discriminatory intent at the motion to dismiss stage, rather she “need only put forth 
allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [it].”  
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The District Court concluded that Bagic’s allegations were “wholly unsupported” 
(App. at 8), and that she failed to “set forth sufficient allegations, beyond mere 
conclusory and speculative statements, that her Croatian ethnicity was the basis for the 
University’s actions.”  (App. at 7.)  But the pleadings and associated documents paint a 
different picture, if viewed from Bagic’s perspective.  It appears that, at the pleading 
stage, enough has been alleged to raise a question of fact about the severity of her 
supposed threat, and the District Court failed to draw reasonable inferences in her favor.   
A. The District Court Erred in Granting the University’s Motion to Dismiss 
Bagic argues that the District Court, in granting the University’s motion to 
dismiss, “improperly weighed evidence” and “ignored … evidence … that no threat ever 
occurred.”  (Opening Br. at 13.)  We agree that the Court did not give her allegations 
their due.   
When considering a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “we must accept as true 
all plausible facts alleged in [the plaintiff’s] complaint and draw all reasonable inferences 
in her favor[,]” In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
“any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin 
is inherently suspect” (citation omitted)).   
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2016), “constru[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to [her.]”  Blanyar v. 
Genova Prod. Inc., 861 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (citation omitted)).  A district court may not 
“weigh[] the credibility of the parties’ positions on” “a question of disputed material 
fact[]” at the motion to dismiss stage, but rather “should … le[ave] such considerations to 
a jury.”  Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 97 (3d Cir. 1999).     
Here, there was a question of fact pertaining to whether Bagic threatened 
Noonan’s life.  Based on certain excerpts from the record of the University’s internal 
appeal,5 the District Court said that Bagic admitted to “Costello that she had threatened 
her colleague.”  (App. at 8.)  We do not read the record that way, and perhaps the District 
Court actually does not either, at least not that starkly.  The Court acknowledged that, 
after “[v]iewing this sworn testimony … in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it seems 
there may have been a misunderstanding[,]” as Bagic “may have been trying to explain 
that her ‘threat’ towards Dr. Noonan was [only] a threat to write a letter of complaint 
about him.”  (App. at 8 n.2 (emphasis added).)  Nevertheless, despite it being “somewhat 
                                                 
 5 Those excerpts were attached in support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and 
were central to and referenced in Bagic’s complaint.  Thus, the District Court did not err 
in its consideration of those documents.  See Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. 
John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A), 768 F.3d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[D]ocuments that 
the defendant attaches to the motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if 
they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the claim.” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).  Bagic concedes that “the law clearly allows the 
District Court to review th[o]se documents.”  (Reply Br. at 3-4.)   
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unclear what the specific threat was[,]” the Court concluded that it could not “find that 
Dr. Costello’s actions in recommending the termination of Plaintiff’s contract were the 
result of purposeful discrimination.”  (App. at 8 n.2.)  There are two problems with that 
conclusion.  
First, the resolution of “what the specific threat was” is a material question of fact 
that should have prevented dismissal.  See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 97 (concluding that the 
district court, on a motion to dismiss, improperly weighed the credibility of the parties’ 
positions on a disputed material fact); Marks v. CDW Comput. Ctrs., Inc., 122 F.3d 363, 
367 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that whether plaintiffs had sufficient information to put them 
on notice of their claims is a question of fact and is “often inappropriate for resolution on 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)”).  The District Court explicitly noted the 
ambiguity regarding the threat, but did not recognize its import.  Bagic alleges that 
Costello reported her statements as a legitimate threat against Noonan “solely based on 
her Croatian nationality and background[,]” and that, upon learning of that allegation, 
others at the University “would jump to the conclusion that as a Croatian, [she] would be 
likely to harm a staff member[.]”  (App. at 82.)  Therefore, if the threat was indeed 
falsely reported, its propagation throughout the University’s investigation and subsequent 
appellate procedures raises a question of discriminatory intent.  And, lest we forget, the 
hearing panel on the University’s internal appeal recommended, and the Chancellor 
found, that the existence of a death threat was unsubstantiated.  The false accusation of a 
death threat, exaggerated from a mere professional complaint, may be a symptom of deep 
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animus based on Bagic’s ethnicity, and, depending on other evidence, could bolster 
Bagic’s claim.   
Second, to the extent there was ambiguity about the nature of Bagic’s threat, the 
District Court was required to draw all inferences in her favor.6  Similarly, Costello’s 
emphasis on Bagic’s time fighting in Croatia could lead to an inference in Bagic’s favor.  
As the District Court said, the notes “seemingly would indicate a bias against her on the 
basis of her ethnicity[.]”  (App. at 10 (emphasis added).)  At the pleading stage, she’s 
entitled to the benefit of that inference.  It was error for the Court to go on and say, 
“viewed in context … the notes seem to merely be references to the actual subjects 
discussed[.]”7  (App. at 10 (emphasis added).)   When considering a motion to dismiss, a 
district court cannot weigh competing inferences and forgo drawing a reasonable one in 
the plaintiff’s favor.8   
                                                 
 6 The complaint’s allegations regarding the University’s internal appeal findings 
can support the conclusion that Bagic’s alleged threat was a permissible professional 
complaint.  For example, based on the University Hearing Panel’s findings, a fact-finder 
in this case could conclude that: (1) Costello was unreliable; (2) “Bagic’s alleged threats 
to kill Noonan could not be substantiated” and (3) that her “termination was 
unreasonable[.]”  (App. at 81.)  Thus, after the University concluded that the alleged 
threat to kill was unfounded – and the threat is alleged to be the only reason offered for 
the termination – one might anticipate that Bagic would be reinstated.  The University, 
however, “refused to reinstate Bagic’s employment contract[.]”  (App. at 81.)  Again, at 
the pleading stage, with all inferences drawn in her favor, Bagic can properly argue that 
the stated reason was therefore not the real reason for her firing.    
    
 7 That context being solely the documents attached to the University’s motion to 
dismiss.   See supra note 5. 
 
 8 Nothing in this opinion prevents the defendants from raising on remand 
arguments about the reach of § 1983 or other arguments previously raised in the District 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand the District Court’s 
dismissal of Bagic’s complaint. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of purposeful discrimination, the Court has not 
considered the other arguments raised by Defendant regarding whether Dr. Costello is a 
state actor and whether Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is time-barred.”)), and we imply 
nothing about the merit any such arguments may have. 
